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ABSTRACT
State-of-the-art password guessing tools, such as HashCat and John
the Ripper, enable users to check billions of passwords per second
against password hashes. In addition to performing straightforward
dictionary attacks, these tools can expand password dictionaries
using password generation rules, such as concatenation of words
(e.g., “password123456”) and leet speak (e.g., “password” becomes
“p4s5w0rd”). Although these rules work well in practice, expanding
them to model further passwords is a laborious task that requires
specialized expertise.
To address this issue, in this paper we introduce PassGAN, a
novel approach that replaces human-generated password rules with
theory-grounded machine learning algorithms. Instead of relying
on manual password analysis, PassGAN uses a Generative Adver-
sarial Network (GAN) to autonomously learn the distribution of real
passwords from actual password leaks, and to generate high-quality
password guesses. Our experiments show that this approach is very
promising. When we evaluated PassGAN on two large password
datasets, we were able to surpass rule-based and state-of-the-art
machine learning password guessing tools. However, in contrast
with the other tools, PassGAN achieved this result without any
a-priori knowledge on passwords or common password structures.
Additionally, when we combined the output of PassGAN with the
output of HashCat, we were able to match 51%-73% more passwords
than with HashCat alone. This is remarkable, because it shows that
PassGAN can autonomously extract a considerable number of pass-
word properties that current state-of-the art rules do not encode.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Passwords are the most popular authentication method, mainly
because they are easy to implement, require no special hardware
or software, and are familiar to users and developers [37]. Unfor-
tunately, multiple password database leaks have shown that users
tend to choose easy-to-guess passwords [15, 20, 49], primarily com-
posed of common strings (e.g., password, 123456, iloveyou), and
variants thereof.
Password guessing tools provide a valuable tool for identifying
weak passwords when they are stored in hashed form [67, 73]. The
effectiveness of password guessing software relies on the ability to
quickly test a large number of highly likely passwords against each
∗This is an extended version of the paper [34], which appeared in NeurIPS 2018
Workshop on Security in Machine Learning (SecML’18).
password hash. Instead of exhaustively trying all possible character
combinations, password guessing tools use words from dictionar-
ies and previous password leaks as candidate passwords. State-
of-the-art password guessing tools, such as John the Ripper [84]
and HashCat [29], take this approach one step further by defining
heuristics for password transformations, which include combina-
tions of multiple words (e.g., iloveyou123456), mixed letter case
(e.g., iLoVeyOu), and leet speak (e.g., il0v3you). These heuristics,
in conjunction with Markov models, allow John the Ripper and
HashCat to generate a large number of new highly likely passwords.
While these heuristics are reasonably successful in practice, they
are ad-hoc and based on intuitions on how users choose passwords,
rather than being constructed from a principled analysis of large
password datasets. For this reason, each technique is ultimately
limited to capturing a specific subset of the password space which
depends upon the intuition behind that technique. Further, devel-
oping and testing new rules and heuristics is a time-consuming
task that requires specialized expertise, and therefore has limited
scalability.
1.1 Our Approach
To address these shortcomings, in this paper we propose to replace
rule-based password guessing, as well as password guessing based
on simple data-driven techniques such as Markov models, with
a novel approach based on deep learning. At its core, our idea is
to train a neural network to determine autonomously password
characteristics and structures, and to leverage this knowledge to
generate new samples that follow the same distribution. We hypoth-
esize that deep neural networks are expressive enough to capture a
large variety of properties and structures that describe the majority
of user-chosen passwords; at the same time, neural networks can be
trained without any a priori knowledge or an assumption of such
properties and structures. This is in stark contrast with current
approaches such as Markov models (which implicitly assume that
all relevant password characteristics can be defined in terms of
n-grams), and rule-based approaches (which can guess only pass-
words that match with the available rules). As a result, samples
generated using a neural network are not limited to a particular
subset of the password space. Instead, neural networks can au-
tonomously encode a wide range of password-guessing knowledge
that includes and surpasses what is captured in human-generated
rules and Markovian password generation processes.
To test this hypothesis, in this paper we introduce PassGAN,
a new approach for generating password guesses based on deep
learning and Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs) [25]. GANs
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are recently-introduced machine-learning tools designed to per-
form density estimation in high-dimensional spaces [25]. GANs
perform implicit generative modeling by training a deep neural
network architecture that is fed a simple random distribution (e.g.,
Gaussian or uniform) and by generating samples that follow the
distribution of the available data. In a way, they implicitly model
the inverse of the cumulative distribution with a deep neural net-
work, i.e., x = F−1θ (s) where s is a uniformly distributed random
variable. To learn the generative model, GANs use a cat-and-mouse
game, in which a deep generative network (G) tries to mimic the
underlying distribution of the samples, while a discriminative deep
neural network (D) tries to distinguish between the original train-
ing samples (i.e., “true samples”) and the samples generated byG
(i.e., “fake samples”). This adversarial procedure forces D to leak
the relevant information about the training data. This information
helpsG to adequately reproduce the original data distribution. Pass-
GAN leverages this technique to generate new password guesses.
We train D using a list of leaked passwords (real samples). At each
iteration, the output of PassGAN (fake samples) gets closer to the
distribution of passwords in the original leak, and therefore more
likely to match real users’ passwords. To the best of our knowledge,
this work is the first to use GANs for this purpose.
1.2 Contributions
PassGAN represents a principled and theory-grounded take on the
generation of password guesses. We explore and evaluate different
neural network configurations, parameters, and training proce-
dures, to identify the appropriate balance between learning and
overfitting, and report our results. Specifically, our contributions
are as follows:
(1) We show that a GAN can generate high-quality password
guesses. Our GAN is trained on a portion of the RockYou
dataset [75], and tested on two different datasets: (1) another
(distinct) subset of the RockYou dataset; and (2) a dataset of
leaked passwords from LinkedIn [48]. In our experiments,
we were able to match 1,350,178 (43.6%) unique passwords
out of 3,094,199 passwords from the RockYou dataset, and
10,478,322 (24.2%) unique passwords out of 43,354,871 pass-
words from the LinkedIn dataset. To quantify the ability of
PassGAN to generate new passwords, we removed from the
testing set all passwords that were present also in the train-
ing set. This resulted in testing sets of size 1,978,367 and
40,593,536 for RockYou and LinkedIn, respectively. In this
setting, PassGAN was able to match 676,439 (34.6%) samples
in the RockYou testing set and 8,878,284 (34.2%) samples in
the LinkedIn set. Moreover, the overwhelming majority of
passwords generated by PassGAN that did not match the
testing sets still “looked like” human-generated passwords,
and thus could potentially match real user accounts not con-
sidered in our experiments.
(2) We show that PassGAN is competitive with state-of-the-art
password generation rules. Even though these rules were
specially tuned for the datasets used in our evaluation, the
quality of PassGAN’s output was comparable to that of pass-
word rules.
(3) With password generation rules, the number of unique pass-
words that can be generated is defined by the number of
rules and by the size of the password dataset used to instan-
tiate them. In contrast, PassGAN can output a practically
unbounded number of password guesses. Crucially, our ex-
periments show that with PassGAN the number of matches
increases steadily with the number of passwords generated.
This is important because it shows that the output of Pass-
GAN is not restricted to a small subset of the password space.
As a result, in our experiments, PassGAN was able to eventu-
ally guess more passwords than any of the other tools, even
though all tools were trained on the same password dataset.
However, this result required PassGAN to generate a more
significant number of passwords with PassGAN than with
the other tools.
(4) PassGAN is competitive with the current state of the art
password guessing algorithms based on deep neural net-
works [52]. Our results show that PassGAN essentiallymatches
the performance of Melicher et al. [52] (indicated as FLA in
the rest of the paper).
(5) We show that PassGAN can be effectively used to augment
password generation rules. In our experiments, PassGAN
matched passwords that were not generated by any pass-
word rule. When we combined the output of PassGAN with
the output of HashCat, we were able to guess between 51%
and 73% additional unique passwords compared to HashCat
alone.
We consider this work as the first step toward a fully automated
generation of high-quality password guesses. Currently, there is
a tradeoff between the benefits of PassGAN (i.e., expressiveness,
generality, and ability to autonomously learn from samples), and
its cost in terms of output size, compared to rule-based approaches.
While rule-based password guessing tools can generate a significant
number of matches within a remarkably small number of attempts,
PassGAN must output a more significant number of passwords to
achieve the same result. We argue that this is, in practice, not an
issue because: (1) password guessing tools can be easily combined
in such a way that once a fast tool (e.g., HashCat) has exhausted
its attempts, a more comprehensive one (such as PassGAN) can
continue to generate new matches; and (2) the cost of storage has
been steadily decreasing for decades, to the point that a cheap
8 TB hard drive can store roughly 1012 password guesses. As such,
password generation can be treated as an offline process.
For these reasons, we believe that meaningful comparisons be-
tween password guessing techniques should primarily focus on the
number of matches that each technique can generate, rather than
how quickly these matches are generated.
We argue that this work is relevant, important, and timely. Rele-
vant, because despite numerous alternatives [19, 22, 68, 81, 95], we
see little evidence that passwords will be replaced any time soon.
Important, because establishing the limits of password guessing—
and better understanding how guessable real-world passwords
are—will help make password-based systems more secure. And
timely, because recent leaks containing hundreds of millions of
passwords [21] provide a formidable source of data for attackers to
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compromise systems, and for system administrators to re-evaluate
password policies.
1.3 PassGAN in the Media and in Academia
The ability of PassGAN to autonomously learn characteristics and
patterns constituting a password, much like DeepMinds’ AlphaGo’s
ability to autonomously learn the game of Go [2], drew significant
attention from several media outlets. For instance, PassGAN has
been reported in articles from Science Magazine [38], The Regis-
ter [86], Inverse [51], Threatpost [54], Dark Reading [88], Technol-
ogy Review News [13], Sensors Online [17], and others [12, 23, 39,
40, 50, 71]. Further, PassGAN was selected by Dark Reading as one
of the coolest hacks of 2017 [32].
UC Berkeley has included PassGAN as reading material in their
graduate-level course titled Special Topics in Deep Learning [5].
1.4 Changes with Respect to an Earlier Version
of this Paper
This paper updates and extends an earlier version of our work [33].
The differences between the two versions of the paper can be sum-
marized as follows: (1) we identified an issue with the PassGAN
implementation used in [33], which led to a substantial decrease
in the number of unique passwords generated. We corrected this
issue and, as a result, in this paper we report a rate of generation
of unique passwords roughly four times higher than in our earlier
work; and (2) in the updated paper, we compare PassGAN with
state-of-the-art password guessing based on Markov Models, and
with the work on neural-network (RNN) by Melicher et al. [52], in
addition to John the Ripper and HashCat.
1.5 Organization
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we briefly
overview GANs, password guessing, and provide a summary of
the relevant state of the art. Section 3 discusses the architectural
and training choices for the GAN used to instantiate PassGAN,
and the hyperparameters used in our evaluation. We report on the
evaluation of PassGAN, and on the comparison with state-of-the-
art password guessing techniques, in Section 4. We summarize our
findings and discuss their implications, in Section 5. We conclude
in Section 6.
2 BACKGROUND AND RELATEDWORK
2.1 Generative Adversarial Networks
Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs) translate the current ad-
vances in deep neural networks for discriminative machine learning
to (implicit) generative modeling. The goal of GANs is to gener-
ate samples from the same distribution as that of its training set
S = {x1, x2, . . . , xn }. Generative modeling [62] typically relies on
closed-form expressions that, in many cases, cannot capture the
nuisance of real data. GANs train a generative deep neural net-
work G that takes as input a multi-dimensional random sample z
(from a Gaussian or uniform distribution) to generate a sample from
the desired distribution. GANs transform the density estimation
problem into a binary classification problem, in which the learning
of the parameters of G is achieved by relying on a discriminative
deep neural network D that needs to distinguish between the “true”
samples in S and the “fake” samples produced byG . More formally,
the optimization problem solved by GANs can be summarized as
follows:
min
θG
max
θD
n∑
i=1
log f (xi ;θD ) +
n∑
j=1
log(1 − f (д(zj ;θG );θD )), (1)
where f (x;θD ) and д(zj ;θG ), respectively, represent D and G. The
optimization shows the clash between the goals of the discriminator
and generator deep neural networks. Since the original work by
Goodfellow et al. [25], there have been several improvements on
GANs [3, 4, 6–8, 10, 14, 16, 27, 35, 36, 42, 47, 53, 55, 56, 58–60, 63, 66,
69, 74, 76, 80, 87, 90, 94, 96], where each new paper provides novel
improvements in the domain. In this paper, we rely on IWGAN [27]
as a building foundation for PassGAN, being that IWGAN [27] is
among the first, most stable approaches for text generation via
GANs. See Section 3 for more details on IWGAN.
2.2 Password Guessing
Password guessing attacks are probably as old as password them-
selves [61], with more formal studies dating back to 1979 [57]. In
a password guessing attack, the adversary attempts to identify
the password of one or more users by repeatedly testing multiple
candidate passwords.
Two popular modern password guessing tools are John the Rip-
per (JTR) [84] and HashCat [29]. Both tools implement multiple
types of password guessing strategies, including: exhaustive brute-
force attacks; dictionary-based attacks; rule-based attacks, which
consist in generating password guesses from transformations of
dictionary words [77, 78]; and Markov-model-based attacks [70, 85].
JTR andHashCat are notably effective at guessing passwords. Specif-
ically, there have been several instances in which well over 90% of
the passwords leaked from online services have been successfully
recovered [72].
Markov models were first used to generate password guesses
by Narayanan et al. [64]. Their approach uses manually defined
password rules, such as which portion of the generated passwords
is composed of letters and numbers. Weir et al. [92] subsequently
improved this technique with Probabilistic Context-Free Grammars
(PCFGs). With PCFGs, Weir et al. [92] demonstrated how to “learn”
these rules from password distributions. Ma et al. [49] and Durmuth
et al. [20] have subsequently extended this early work.
To the best of our knowledge, the first work in the domain of pass-
words utilizing neural networks dates back to 2006 by Ciaramella
et al. [11]. Recently, Melicher et al. [52] introduced FLA, a pass-
word guessing method based on recurrent neural networks [26, 83].
However, the primary goal of these works consists in providing
means for password strength estimation. For instance, Melicher
et al. [52] aim at providing fast and accurate password strength
estimation (thus FLA acronym), while keeping the model as light-
weight as possible, and minimizing accuracy loss. By keeping the
model lightweight, FLA instantiates a password strength estimator
that can be used in browsers through a (local) JavaScript imple-
mentation. To achieve this goal, FLA uses weight clipping without
significantly sacrificing accuracy. In contrast, PassGAN focuses
on the task of password guessing and attempts to do so with no
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Figure 1: Representation of one Residual Block component
constituting PassGAN
a priori knowledge or assumption on the Markovian structure of
user-chosen passwords.
3 EXPERIMENT SETUP
To leverage the ability of GANs to estimate the probability effec-
tively distribution of passwords from the training set, we experi-
mented with a variety of parameters. In this section, we report our
choices on specific GAN architecture and hyperparameters.
We instantiated PassGAN using the Improved training of Wasser-
stein GANs (IWGAN) of Gulrajani et al. [27]. The IWGAN imple-
mentation used in this paper relies on the ADAM optimizer [43] to
minimize the training error.
The following hyper-parameters characterize our model:
• Batch size, which represents the number of passwords from
the training set that propagate through the GAN at each step
of the optimizer. We instantiated our model with a batch size
of 64.
• Number of iterations, which indicates how many times
the GAN invokes its forward step and its back-propagation
step [45, 46, 79]. In each iteration, the GAN runs one gen-
erator iteration and one or more discriminator iterations.
We trained the GAN using various number of iterations and
eventually settled for 199,000 iterations, as further iterations
provided diminishing returns in the number of matches.
• Number of discriminator iterations per generator iter-
ation, which indicates how many iterations the discrimina-
tor performs in each GAN iteration. The number of discrimi-
nator iterations per generative iteration was set to 10, which
is the default value used by IWGAN.
• Model dimensionality, which represents the number of
dimensions for each convolutional layer. We experimented
using 5 residual layers for both the generator and the discrim-
inator, with each of the layers in both deep neural networks
having 128 dimensions.
• Gradient penalty coefficient (λ), which specifies the penalty
applied to the norm of the gradient of the discriminator with
respect to its input [27]. Increasing this parameter leads to
a more stable training of the GAN [27]. In our experiments,
we set the value of the gradient penalty to 10.
• Output sequence length, which indicates the maximum
length of the strings generated by the generator (G). Wemod-
ified the length of the sequence generated by the GAN from
32 characters (default length for IWGAN) to 10 characters,
to match the maximum length of passwords used during
training.
• Size of the input noise vector (seed), which determines
how many random numbers from a normal distribution are
fed as input toG to generate samples. We set this size to 128
floating point numbers.
• Maximum number of examples, which represents the
maximum number of training items (passwords, in the case
of PassGAN) to load. The maximum number of examples
loaded by the GAN was set to the size of the entire training
dataset.
• Adam optimizer’s hyper-parameters:
– Learning rate, i.e., how quickly the weights of the model
are adjusted
– Coefficient β1, which specifies the decaying rate of the
running average of the gradient.
– Coefficient β2, which indicates the decaying rate of the
running average of the square of the gradient.
Coefficients β1 and β2 of the Adam optimizer were set to
0.5 and 0.9, respectively, while the learning rate was 10−4.
These parameters are the default values used by Gulrajani
et al. [27].
Figure 1 shows the structure of one residual block in PassGAN.
Figures 2a and 2b provide an overview of PassGAN’s Generator
and Discriminator models. In our experiments, we used 5 residual
blocks in each model.
Our experiments were run using the TensorFlow implementa-
tion of IWGAN found at [28]. We used TensorFlow version 1.2.1 for
GPUs [1], with Python version 2.7.12. All experiments were per-
formed on a workstation running Ubuntu 16.04.2 LTS, with 64GB of
RAM, a 12-core 2.0 GHz Intel Xeon CPU, and an NVIDIA GeForce
GTX 1080 Ti GPU with 11GB of global memory.
IWGAN. The building blocks used to construct IWGAN [27], and
consequently PassGAN, are Residual Blocks, an example of which
is shown in Figure 1. They are the central component of Residual
Networks (ResNets), introduced by He et al., [31] at CVPR’16. When
training a deep neural network, initially the training error decreases
as the number of layer increases. However, after reaching a certain
number of layers, training error starts increasing again.
To address this problem, He et al. [31] introduced ResNet. In con-
trast with other deep neural networks, ResNet includes “shortcut
connection” between layers [65]. This can be seen as a wrapper
for these layers and is implemented as the identity function (indi-
cated as Residual Block in Figure 1). By using multiple consecutive
residual blocks, ResNet consistently reduces training error as the
number of layers increases.
Residual Blocks in PassGAN are composed of two 1-dimensional
convolutional layers, connected with one another with rectified
linear units (ReLU) activation functions, Figure 1. The input of the
block is the identity function, and is increased with 0.3·output of
convolutional layers to produce the output of the block. Figures
2a and 2b provide a schematic view of PassGAN’s Generator and
Discriminatormodels. In our experiments, we used 5 residual blocks,
(see Figure 1).
3.1 Training and Testing
To evaluate the performance of PassGAN, and to compare it with
state-of-the-art password generation rules, we first trained the GAN,
JTR, HashCat, the Markov model, PCFG, and FLA on a large set of
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Figure 2: PassGAN’s Architecture. During the training procedure, the discriminator D processes passwords from the training
dataset, as well as password samples produced by the generatorG. Based on the feedback from D,G fine-tunes its parameters
to produce password samples that are distributed similarly to the samples in the training set. In our setting, once the training
procedure is complete, we use G to generate password guesses.
passwords from the RockYou password leak [75].1 Entries in this
dataset represent a mixture of common and complex passwords.
RockYou Dataset. The RockYou dataset [75] contains 32,503,388
passwords. We selected all passwords of length 10 characters or less
(29,599,680 passwords, which correspond to 90.8% of the dataset),
and used 80% of them (23,679,744 total passwords, 9,926,278 unique
passwords) to train each password guessing tool. We refer the
reader to Section 3.2 for further details on the training procedure of
each tool. For testing, we computed the (set) difference between the
remaining 20% of the dataset (5,919,936 total passwords, 3,094,199
unique passwords) and the training test. The resulting 1,978,367
entries correspond to passwords that were not previously observed
by the password guessing tools. This allowed us to count only
non-trivial matches in the testing set.
LinkedIn Dataset. We also tested each tool on passwords from
the LinkedIn dataset [48], of length up to 10 characters, and that
were not present in the training set. The LinkedIn dataset consists
of 60,065,486 total unique passwords (43,354,871 unique passwords
with length 10 characters or less), out of which 40,593,536 were
not in the training dataset from RockYou. (Frequency counts were
not available for the LinkedIn dataset.) Passwords in the LinkedIn
dataset were exfiltrated as hashes, rather than in plaintext. As such,
the LinkedIn dataset contains only plaintext passwords that tools
such as JTR and HashCat were able to recover, thus giving rule-
based systems a potential edge.
Our training and testing procedures showed: (1) how well Pass-
GAN predicts passwords when trained and tested on the same
password distribution (i.e., when using the RockYou dataset for
both training and testing); and (2) whether PassGAN generalizes
across password datasets, i.e., how it performs when trained on the
RockYou dataset, and tested on the LinkedIn dataset.
3.2 Password Sampling Procedure for HashCat,
JTR, Markov Model, PCFG and FLA
We used the portion of RockYou dataset selected for training, see
Section 3.1, as the input dataset to HashCat Best64, HashCat gen2,
JTR Spiderlab rules, Markov Model, PCFG, and FLA, and generated
passwords as follows:
1We consider the use of publicly available password datasets to be ethical, and
consistent with security research best practices (see, e.g., [9, 15, 52]).
• We instantiated HashCat and JTR’s rules using passwords
from the training set sorted by frequency in descending
order (as in [52]). HashCat Best64 generated 754,315,842
passwords, out of which 361,728,683 were unique and of
length 10 characters or less. Note that this was the maximum
number of samples produced by Best64 rule-set for the given
input set, i.e., RockYou training set. With HashCat gen2 and
JTR SpiderLab we uniformly sampled a random subset of
size 109 from their output. This subset was composed of
passwords of length 10 characters or less.
• For FLA, we set up the code from [44] according to the
instruction provided in [24]. We trained a model contain-
ing 2-hidden layers and 1 dense layer of size 512 (for the
full list of parameters see Table 6 in Appendix A). We did
not perform any transformation (e.g., removing symbols, or
transforming all characters to lowercase) on the training
set for the sake of consistency with the other tools. Once
trained, FLA enumerates a subset of its output space defined
by a probability threshold p: a password belongs to FLA’s
output if and only if its estimated probability is at least p. In
our experiments, we set p = 10−10. This resulted in a total of
747,542,984 passwords of length 10 characters or less. Before
using these passwords in our evaluation, we sorted them by
probability in descending order.
• We generated 494,369,794 unique passwords of length 10
or less using the 3-gram Markov model. We ran this model
using its standard configuration [18].
• We generated 109 unique passwords of length 10 or less
using the PCFG implementation of Weir et al. [91].
4 EVALUATION
In this section, we present our evaluation steps. We first evaluate
the number of matches generated by PassGAN’s output, and then
compare it with FLA, with a popular 3-gram implementation of
Markov models [18], with PCFGs [91], and with password gener-
ation rules for JTR (SpiderLab mangling rules [82]) and HashCat
(Best64 and gen2 rules [29]). These password generation rules are
commonly used in the password guessing literature (see, e.g., [52]),
and have been optimized over several years on password datasets
including RockYou and LinkedIn. Because of these dataset-specific
optimizations, we consider these rules a good representation of the
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Table 1: Number of passwords generated by PassGAN that
match passwords in the RockYou testing set. Results are
shown in terms of unique matches.
Passwords
Generated
Unique
Passwords
Passwords matched in testing
set, and not in training set
(1,978,367 unique samples)
104 9,738 103 (0.005%)
105 94,400 957 (0.048%)
106 855,972 7,543 (0.381%)
107 7,064,483 40,320 (2.038%)
108 52,815,412 133,061 (6.726%)
109 356,216,832 298,608 (15.094%)
1010 2,152,819,961 515,079 (26.036%)
2 · 1010 3,617,982,306 584,466 (29.543%)
3 · 1010 4,877,585,915 625,245 (31.604%)
4 · 1010 6,015,716,395 653,978 (33.056%)
5 · 1010 7,069,285,569 676,439 (34.192%)
best matching performance that can be obtained with rules-based
password guessing. Further, we provide experimental results evalu-
ating PassGAN in combination with HashCat Best64. We conclude
the section providing a comparison between PassGAN and FLA in
terms of probability densities and password distribution.
4.1 PassGAN’s Output Space
To evaluate the size of the password space generated by PassGAN,
we generated several password sets of sizes between 104 and 1010.
Our experiments show that, as the number of passwords increased,
so did the number of unique (and therefore new) passwords gener-
ated. Results of this evaluation are reported in Table 1.
When we increased the number of passwords generated by Pass-
GAN, the rate at which new unique passwords were generated
decreased only slightly. Similarly, the rate of increase of the num-
ber of matches (shown in Table 1) diminished slightly as the number
of passwords generated increased. This is to be expected, as the
simpler passwords are matched early on, and the remaining (more
complex) passwords require a substantially larger number of at-
tempts in order to be matched.
Impact of Training Process on Overfitting. Training a GAN is an
iterative process that consists of a large number of iterations. As the
number of iterations increases, the GAN learns more information
from the distribution of the data. However, increasing the number
of steps also increases the probability of overfitting [25, 93].
To evaluate this tradeoff on password data, we stored interme-
diate training checkpoints and generated 108 passwords at each
checkpoint. Figure 3 shows how many of these passwords match
with the content of the RockYou testing set. In general, the number
of matches increases with the number of iterations. This increase
tapers off around 125,000-135,000 iterations, and then again around
190,000-195,000 iterations, where we stopped training the GAN.
This indicates that further increasing the number of iterations will
likely lead to overfitting, thus reducing the ability of the GAN to
generate a wide variety of highly likely passwords. Therefore, we
consider this range of iterations adequate for the RockYou train-
ing set.
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Figure 3: Number of unique passwords generated by Pass-
GAN on various checkpoints, matching the RockYou testing
set. The x axis represents the number of iterations (check-
points) of PassGAN’s training process. For each checkpoint,
we sampled 108 passwords from PassGAN.
4.2 Evaluating the Passwords Generated by
PassGAN
To evaluate the quality of the output of PassGAN, we generated
5 · 1010 passwords, out of which roughly 7 · 109 were unique. We
compared these passwords with the outputs of length 10 characters
or less from HashCat Best64, HashCat gen2, JTR SpiderLab, FLA,
PCFG, and Markov model, see Section 3.2 for the configuration and
sampling procedures followed for each of these tools.
In our comparisons, we aimed at establishing whether PassGAN
was able to meet the performance of the other tools, despite its lack
of any a-priori knowledge on password structures. This is because
we are primarily interested in determining whether the proper-
ties that PassGAN autonomously extracts from a list of passwords
can represent enough information to compete with state-of-the-
art human-generated rules and Markovian password generation
processes.
Our results show that, for each of the tools, PassGAN was able
to generate at least the same number of matches. Additionally,
to achieve this result, PassGAN needed to generate a number of
passwords that was within one order of magnitude of each of the
other tools. This holds for both the RockYou and the LinkedIn
testing sets. This is not unexpected, because while other tools rely
on prior knowledge on passwords for guessing, PassGAN does not.
Table 2 summarizes our findings for the RockYou testing set, while
Table 3 shows our results for the LinkedIn test set.
Our results also show that PassGAN has an advantage with
respect to rule-based password matching when guessing passwords
from a dataset different from the one it was trained on. In particular,
PassGAN was able to match more passwords than HashCat within
a smaller number of attempts (2.1 · 109 – 3.6 · 109 for LinkedIn,
compared to 4.8 · 109 – 5.06 · 109 for RockYou).
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Table 2: Number of matches generated by each password guessing tool against the RockYou testing set, and corresponding
number of password generated by PassGAN to outperform each tool. Matches for HashCat Best64 and FLA were obtained by
exhaustively enumerating the entire output of each tool. The minimum probability threshold for FLA was set to p = 10−10.
Approach (1) UniquePasswords (2) Matches
(3) Number of passwords
required for PassGAN
to outperform (2)
(4) PassGAN
Matches
JTR
Spyderlab 10
9 461,395 (23.32%) 1.4 · 109 461,398 (23.32%)
Markov Model
3-gram 4.9 · 108 532,961 (26.93%) 2.47 · 109 532,962 (26.93%)
HashCat
gen2 10
9 597,899 (30.22%) 4.8 · 109 625,245 (31.60%)
HashCat
Best64 3.6 · 108 630,068 (31.84%) 5.06 · 109 630,335 (31.86%)
PCFG 109 486,416 (24.59%) 2.1 · 109 511,453 (25.85%)
FLA
p = 10−10 7.4 · 10
8 652,585 (32.99%) 6 · 109 653,978 (33.06%)
Table 3: Number of matches generated by each password guessing tool against the LinkedIn testing set, and corresponding
number of password generated by PassGAN to outperform each tool. Matches for HashCat Best64 and FLA were obtained by
exhaustively enumerating the entire output of each tool. The minimum probability threshold for FLA was set to p = 10−10.
Approach (1) UniquePasswords (2) Matches
(3) Number of passwords
required for PassGAN
to outperform (2)
(4) PassGAN
Matches
JTR
Spyderlab 10
9 6,840,797 (16.85%) 2.7 · 109 6,841,217 (16.85%)
Markov Model
3-gram 4.9 · 108 5,829,786 (14.36%) 1.6 · 109 5,829,916 (14.36%)
HashCat
gen2 10
9 6,308,515 (15.54%) 2.1 · 109 6,309,799 (15.54%)
HashCat
Best64 3.6 · 108 7,174,990 (17.67%) 3.6 · 109 7,419,248 (18.27%)
PCFG 109 7,288,553 (17.95%) 3.6 · 109 7,419,248 (18.27%)
FLA
p = 10−10 7.4 · 10
8 8,290,173 (20.42%) 6 · 109 8,519,060 (21.00%)
4.3 Combining PassGAN with HashCat
Tomaximize the number of passwords guessed, the adversarywould
typically use the output of multiple tools in order to combine the
benefits of rule-based tools (e.g., fast password generation) and
ML-based tools (e.g., generation of a large number of guesses).
To evaluate PassGAN in this setting, we removed all passwords
matched by HashCat Best64 (the best performing set of rules in our
experiments) from the RockYou and LinkedIn testing sets. This led
to two new test sets, containing 1,348,300 (RockYou) and 33,394,178
(LinkedIn) passwords, respectively.
Our results show that the number of matches steadily increases
with the number of samples produced by PassGAN. In particular,
when we used 7 · 109 passwords from PassGAN, we were able to
match 51% (320,365) of passwords from the “new” RockYou dataset,
and 73% (5,262,427) additional passwords from the “new” LinkedIn
dataset. This confirms that combining rules with machine learning
password guessing is an effective strategy. Moreover, it confirms
that PassGAN can capture portions of the password space not
covered by rule-based approaches. With this in mind, a recent
version of HashCat [30] introduced a generic password candidate
interface called “slow candidates”, enabling the use of tools such as
PCFGs [92], OMEN [20], PassGAN, and more with HashCat.
4.4 Comparing PassGAN with FLA
In this section, we concentrate on comparing PassGANwith FLAhav-
ing a particular focus on the probability estimation. FLA is based
on recurrent neural networks [26, 83], and typically the model
is trained on password leaks from several websites, in our case
the RockYou training set. During password generation, the neural
network generates one password character at a time. Each new
character (including a special end-of-password character) is com-
puted based on its probability, given the current output state, in
what is essentially a Markov process. Given a trained FLA model,
FLA outputs the following six fields: (1) password, (2) the prob-
ability of that password, (3) the estimated output guess number,
i.e., the strength of that password, (4) the standard deviation of
the randomized trial for this password (in units of the number of
guesses), (5) the number of measurements for this password and
(6) the estimated confidence interval for the guess number (in units
of the number of guesses). The evaluation presented in [52] shows
that their technique outperforms Markov models, PCFGs and pass-
word composition rules commonly used with JTR and HashCat,
when testing a large number of password guesses (in the 1010 to
1025 range).
We believe that one of the limitations of FLA resides precisely
in the Markovian nature of the process used to estimate passwords.
For instance, 123456; 12345; and, 123456789 are the three most
common passwords in the RockYou dataset, being roughly one
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Figure 4: Percentage of passwords matched by FLA at a par-
ticular number of guesses, that are matched by PassGAN in
at most 7 · 109 attempts.
every 66-passwords. Similarly, the most common passwords pro-
duced by FLA start with “123” or use the word “love”, Table 4b.
In contrast, PassGAN’s most commonly generated passwords, Ta-
ble 4c, tend to show more variability with samples composed of
names, the combination of names and numbers, and more. When
compared with Table 4a, the most likely samples from PassGAN
exhibit closer resemblance to the training set and its probabilities
than FLA does. We argue that due to the Markovian structure of
the password generation process in FLA, any password character-
istic that is not captured within the scope of an n−gram, might
not be encoded by FLA. For instance, if a meaningful subset of
10-character passwords is constructed as the concatenation of two
words (e.g., MusicMusic), any Markov process with n ≤ 5 will not
be able to capture this behavior properly. On the other hand, given
enough examples, the neural network used in PassGAN will be able
to learn this property. As a result, while password pookypooky was
assigned a probability p ≈ 10−33 by FLA (with an estimated number
of guessing attempts of about 1029), it was guessed after roughly
108 attempts by PassGAN.
To investigate further on the differences between PassGAN and
FLA, we computed the number of passwords in the RockYou testing
set for which FLA required at least 1010 attempts and that PassGAN
was able to guess within its first 7 · 109 samples. These are the
passwords to which FLA assigns low probabilities, despite being
chosen by some users. Because PassGAN can model them, we con-
clude that the probabilities assigned by FLA to these passwords are
incorrect. Figure 4 presents our result as the ratio between the pass-
words matched by FLA at a particular number of guessing attempts,
and by PassGAN within its first 7 · 109 attempts. Our results show
that PassGAN can model a number of passwords more correctly
than FLA. However, this advantage decreased as the number of
attempts required for FLA to guess a password increased, i.e., as
the estimated probability of that password decreased. This shows
that, in general, the two tools agree on assigning probabilities to
passwords.
4.5 A Closer Look at Non-matched Passwords
We inspected a list of passwords generated by PassGAN that did
not match any of the testing sets and determined that many of
these passwords are reasonable candidates for human-generated
passwords. As such, we speculate that a possibly large number of
passwords generated by PassGAN, that did not match our test sets,
might still match user accounts from services other than RockYou
and LinkedIn. We list a small sample of these passwords in Table 5.
5 REMARKS
In this section, we summarize the findings from our experiments,
and discuss their relevance in the context of password guessing.
Character-level GANs are well suited for generating password
guesses. In our experiments, PassGAN was able to match 34.2% of
the passwords in a testing set extracted from the RockYou password
dataset, when trained on a different subset of RockYou. Further, we
were able to match 21.9% of the password in the LinkedIn dataset
when PassGAN was trained on the RockYou password set. This
is remarkable because PassGAN was able to achieve these results
with no additional information on the passwords that are present
only in the testing dataset. In other words, PassGAN was able to
correctly guess a large number of passwords that it did not observe
given access to nothing more than a set of samples.
Current rule-based password guessing is very efficient but lim-
ited. In our experiments, rule-based systems were able to match or
outperform other password guessing tools when the number of al-
lowed guesses was small. This is a testament to the ability of skilled
security experts to encode rules that generate correct matches with
high probability. However, our experiments also confirmed that the
main downside of rule-based password guessing is that rules can
generate only a finite, relatively small set of passwords. In contrast,
PassGAN was able to eventually surpass the number of matches
achieved using password generation rules.
As a result, the best password guessing strategy is to use multiple
tools. In our experiments, each password guessing approach has
an edge in a different setting. Our results confirm that combining
multiple techniques leads to the best overall performance. For in-
stance, by combining the output of PassGAN with the output of the
Best64 rules, we were able to match 48% of the passwords in the
RockYou testing dataset (which represents a 50.8% increase in the
number of matches) and 30.6% of the passwords from the LinkedIn
dataset—an increase of about 73.3%. Given the current performance
of both PassGAN and FLA, it is not unlikely that tools alone will
soon be able to replace rule-based password guessing tools entirely.
GANs are expressive enough to generate passwords from Markov-
ian processes, rules, and to capture more general password structures.
Our experiments show that PassGAN is competitive with FLA,
which treats password guessing primarily as a Markovian process.
Without any knowledge of password rules or guidance on pass-
word structure, PassGAN was able to match the performance of
FLA within an order of magnitude of guesses by leveraging only
knowledge that it was able to extract from a limited number of sam-
ples. Further, because GANs are more general tools than Markov
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Table 4: (a) Top-50 passwords present in RockYou training dataset sorted by frequency. (b) Frequency of the 50 most common
outputs of FLA, and corresponding frequency and rank in the RockYou training set. Passwords are sorted by the probability
assigned by FLA. (c) Frequency of the 50 most common outputs of PassGAN, and corresponding frequency and rank in the
RockYou training set. Passwords are sorted by the frequency in which they appear in PassGAN’s output. “—” indicates that
the password was not in the training set.
(a) RockYou Training Set
Password
Number of
Occurrences in
Training Set
Frequency in
Training Set
123456 232,844 0.9833%
12345 63,135 0.2666%
123456789 61,531 0.2598%
password 47,507 0.2006%
iloveyou 40,037 0.1691%
princess 26,669 0.1126%
1234567 17,399 0.0735%
rockyou 16,765 0.0708%
12345678 16,536 0.0698%
abc123 13,243 0.0559%
nicole 12,992 0.0549%
daniel 12,337 0.0521%
babygirl 12,130 0.0512%
monkey 11,726 0.0495%
lovely 11,533 0.0487%
jessica 11,262 0.0476%
654321 11,181 0.0472%
michael 11,174 0.0472%
ashley 10,741 0.0454%
qwerty 10,730 0.0453%
iloveu 10,587 0.0447%
111111 10,529 0.0445%
000000 10,412 0.0440%
michelle 10,210 0.0431%
tigger 9,381 0.0396%
sunshine 9,252 0.0391%
chocolate 9,012 0.0381%
password1 8,916 0.0377%
soccer 8,752 0.0370%
anthony 8,564 0.0362%
friends 8,557 0.0361%
butterfly 8,427 0.0356%
angel 8,425 0.0356%
purple 8,381 0.0354%
jordan 8,123 0.0343%
liverpool 7,846 0.0331%
loveme 7,818 0.0330%
justin 7,769 0.0328%
fuckyou 7,702 0.0325%
football 7,559 0.0319%
123123 7,545 0.0319%
secret 7,458 0.0315%
andrea 7,395 0.0312%
carlos 7,281 0.0307%
jennifer 7,229 0.0305%
joshua 7,186 0.0303%
bubbles 7,031 0.0297%
1234567890 6,953 0.0294%
hannah 6,911 0.0292%
superman 6,855 0.0289%
(b) FLA
Password Rank inTraining Set
Frequency in
Training Set
Probability
assigned by
FLA
123456 1 0.9833% 2.81E-3
12345 2 0.2666% 1.06E-3
123457 3,224 0.0016% 2.87E-4
1234566 5,769 0.0010% 1.85E-4
1234565 9,692 0.0006% 1.11E-4
1234567 7 0.0735% 1.00E-4
12345669 848,078 0.0000% 9.84E-5
123458 7,359 0.0008% 9.54E-5
12345679 7,818 0.0007% 9.07E-5
123459 8,155 0.0007% 7.33E-5
lover 457 0.0079% 6.73E-5
love 384 0.0089% 6.09E-5
223456 69,163 0.0001% 5.14E-5
22345 118,098 0.0001% 4.61E-5
1234564 293,340 0.0000% 3.81E-5
123454 23,725 0.0003% 3.56E-5
1234569 5,305 0.0010% 3.54E-5
lovin 39,712 0.0002% 3.21E-5
loven 57,862 0.0001% 3.09E-5
iloveyou 5 0.1691% 3.05E-5
1234568 6,083 0.0009% 2.99E-5
223455 1,699,287 0.0000% 2.68E-5
12345668 1,741,520 0.0000% 2.64E-5
1234561 12,143 0.0005% 2.59E-5
123455 5,402 0.0010% 2.58E-5
ilover 45,951 0.0002% 2.52E-5
love15 2,074 0.0025% 2.39E-5
12345660 — — 2.39E-5
1234560 3,477 0.0015% 2.34E-5
123456789 3 0.2598% 2.27E-5
love11 1,735 0.0029% 2.21E-5
12345667 252,961 0.0000% 2.11E-5
12345678 9 0.0698% 2.11E-5
223457 8,929,184 0.0000% 2.09E-5
love12 565 0.0067% 2.05E-5
lovo — — 2.03E-5
12345666 46,540 0.0002% 1.98E-5
123456689 — — 1.97E-5
1234562 92,917 0.0001% 1.92E-5
12345699 197,906 0.0000% 1.90E-5
123451 9,950 0.0006% 1.89E-5
123450 7,186 0.0008% 1.88E-5
loves 779 0.0054% 1.83E-5
1234576 61,296 0.0001% 1.80E-5
love13 1,251 0.0038% 1.78E-5
lovele 154,468 0.0001% 1.78E-5
lovine 4,497,922 0.0000% 1.75E-5
lovi 4,498,263 0.0000% 1.74E-5
iloven 323,339 0.0000% 1.59E-5
lovina 62,446 0.0001% 1.53E-5
(c) PassGAN
Password Rank inTraining Set
Frequency in
Training Set
Frequency in
PassGAN’s
Output
123456 1 0.9833% 1.0096%
123456789 3 0.25985% 0.222%
12345 2 0.26662% 0.2162%
iloveyou 5 0.16908% 0.1006%
1234567 7 0.07348% 0.0755%
angel 33 0.03558% 0.0638%
12345678 9 0.06983% 0.0508%
iloveu 21 0.04471% 0.0485%
angela 109 0.01921% 0.0338%
daniel 12 0.0521% 0.033%
sweety 90 0.02171% 0.0257%
angels 57 0.02787% 0.0245%
maria 210 0.01342% 0.0159%
loveyou 52 0.0287% 0.0154%
andrew 55 0.02815% 0.0131%
123256 301,429 0.00003% 0.013%
iluv!u — — 0.0127%
dangel 38,800 0.00018% 0.0123%
michel 1,442 0.00335% 0.0119%
marie 483 0.00755% 0.0118%
andres 223 0.01274% 0.0106%
lovely 15 0.0487% 0.0103%
123458 7,352 0.00076% 0.0099%
sweet 329 0.00999% 0.0097%
prince 243 0.01217% 0.0092%
ilove 2,177 0.00234% 0.0089%
hello 61 0.02648% 0.0086%
angel1 184 0.01459% 0.0085%
iluveu 58,131 0.00013% 0.0083%
723456 337,321 0.00003% 0.0082%
loveu 852 0.00505% 0.0082%
lovers 70 0.0253% 0.0082%
iluv!you — — 0.0082%
bella 732 0.00562% 0.0081%
andrea 43 0.03123% 0.0081%
iluveyou 183,386 0.00004% 0.0079%
kella 180,219 0.00004% 0.0076%
michelle 24 0.04312% 0.0074%
mariana 228 0.01265% 0.0074%
marian 681 0.00593% 0.0073%
daniela 95 0.02064% 0.0072%
dancer 122 0.01799% 0.0072%
lovery 46,470 0.00016% 0.0071%
dancel 42,692 0.00017% 0.007%
23456 3,976 0.00134% 0.007%
1g3456 — — 0.007%
loveme 37 0.03302% 0.007%
jessie 213 0.01329% 0.0069%
buster 145 0.01619% 0.0068%
anger 172,425 0.00005% 0.0067%
Table 5: Sample of passwords generated by PassGAN that did
not match the testing sets.
love42743 ilovey2b93 paolo9630 italyit
sadgross usa2598 s13trumpy trumpart3
ttybaby5 dark1106 vamperiosa ~dracula
saddracula luvengland albania. bananabake
paleyoung @crepess emily1015 enemy20
goku476 coolarse18 iscoolin serious003
nyc1234 thepotus12 greatrun babybad528
santazone apple8487 1loveyoung bitchin706
toshibaod tweet1997b 103tears 1holys01
models, in our experiment PassGAN was able to generate match-
ing passwords that were ranked as very unlikely by FLA, using a
limited number of guesses.
GANs generalize well to password datasets other than their training
dataset. When we evaluated PassGAN on a dataset (LinkedIn [48])
distinct from its training set (RockYou [75]), the drop in matching
rate was modest, especially compared to other tools. Moreover,
when tested on LinkedIn, PassGAN was able to match the other
tools within a lower or equal number of guesses compared to Rock-
You.
State-of-the-art GANs density estimation is correct only for a subset
of the space they generate. Our experiments show that IWGAN’s
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density estimation matches the training set for high-frequency pass-
words. This is important because it allows PassGAN to generate
highly-likely candidate passwords early. However, our experiments
also show that as the frequency of a password decreases, the quality
of PassGAN’s density estimation deteriorates. While this becomes
less relevant as PassGAN generates more passwords, it shows that
the number of passwords that PassGAN needs to output to achieve
a particular number of matches could significantly decrease if it is
instantiated using a character-level GAN that performs more accu-
rate density estimation. Similarly, a more extensive training dataset,
coupled with a more complex neural network structure, could im-
prove density estimation (and therefore PassGAN’s performance)
significantly.
Final Remarks. GANs estimate the density distribution of the
training dataset. As a result, PassGAN outputs repeated password
guesses, as shown on Table 4c. While a full brute-force guessing
attack would have full coverage, learning from the training data
distribution allows PassGAN to perform a more efficient attack by
generating highly likely guesses. Because password generation can
be performed offline, PassGAN could produce several billions of
guesses beforehand, and store them in a database. In our experi-
ments, we stored unique password samples, and later used these
samples for testing purposes, thus avoiding repetitions. If needed,
Bloom filters with appropriate parameters could also be used to
discard repeated entries, thus enabling efficient online password
guessing.
Clearly, PassGAN can be used in a distributed setting, in which
several instances independently output password guesses. While
it is possible to avoid local repetitions using, e.g., Bloom filters,
coordinating the removal of duplicates among different nodes is
more complex and, potentially, more expensive. The appropriate
way to address this problem depends primarily on three factors:
(1) the cost of generating a password guess; (2) the cost of testing
a password guess; and (3) the cost of synchronizing information
about previously-generated password between nodes.
If the cost of generating passwords is less than the cost of testing
them, and synchronization among nodes is not free, then avoiding
repetitions across nodes is not essential. Therefore each model can
sample without the need of being aware of other models’ generated
samples.
If the cost of testing password guesses is less than the cost of gen-
erating them, then it might be beneficial to periodically coordinate
among nodes to determine which samples have been generated.
The synchronization cost dictates the frequency of coordination.
Finally, PassGAN could significantly benefit and improve from
new leaked password datasets. The model would improve by learn-
ing new rules, and the number of repeated samples could potentially
be reduced.
6 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we introduced PassGAN, the first password guess-
ing technique based on generative adversarial networks (GANs).
PassGAN is designed to learn password distribution information
from password leaks. As a result, unlike current password guessing
tools, PassGAN does not rely on any additional information, such
as explicit rules, or assumptions on the Markovian structure of
user-chosen passwords. We believe that our approach to password
guessing is revolutionary because PassGAN generates passwords
with no user intervention—thus requiring no domain knowledge
on passwords, nor manual analysis of password database leaks.
We evaluated PassGAN’s performance by testing how well it can
guess passwords that it was not trained on, and how the distribution
of PassGAN’s output approximates the distribution of real password
leaks. Our results show that PassGAN is competitive with state-of-
the-art password generation tools: in our experiments, PassGAN
was always able to generate the same number of matches as the
other password guessing tools.
However, PassGAN currently requires to output a larger number
of passwords compared to other tools. We believe that this cost is
negligible when considering the benefits of the proposed technique.
Further, training PassGAN on a larger dataset enables the use of
more complex neural network structures, and more comprehensive
training. As a result, the underlying GAN can perform more accu-
rate density estimation, thus reducing the number of passwords
needed to achieve a specific number of matches.
Changing the generative model behind PassGAN to a conditional
GAN might improve password guessing in all scenarios in which
the adversary knows a set of keywords commonly used by the user
(e.g., the names of user’s pets and family members). Given this
knowledge, the adversary could condition the GAN to these partic-
ular words, thus enabling the generator to give special attention to
a specific portion of the search space where these keywords reside.
PassGAN can potentially be used in the context of generating
Honeywords [41]. Honeywords are decoy passwords that, when
mixed with real passwords, substantially reduce the value of a
password database for the adversary. However, Wang et al. [89],
raised concerns about the techniques proposed in [41] to generate
Honeywords: if Honeywords can be easily distinguished from real
passwords, then their usefulness is significantly reduced. An exten-
sion of PassGAN could potentially address this problem and will
be the subject of future work.
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A CONFIGURATION PARAMETERS FOR
RUNNING FLA
We run the code that implements the password metering and guess-
ing tool introduced in [52] using the parameters listed in Table 6.
Table 6: Training configuration used for FLA
Configuration Parameters Value
training_chunk 128
training_main_memory_chunk 23679744
min_len 4
max_len 10
context_length 10
chunk_print_interval 1000
layers 2
hidden_size 1000
generations 20
training_accuracy_threshold -1
train_test_ratio 20
model_type JZS2
train_backwards True
dense_layers 1
dense_hidden_size 512
secondary_training False
simulated_frequency_optimization False
randomize_training_order True
uppercase_character_optimization False
rare_character_optimization False
rare_character_optimization_guessing False
no_end_word_cache True
intermediate_fname data.sqlite
save_model_versioned True
12
